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The research to be presented here was intended to demonstrate that only in terms of its political
stability can Costa Rica's democratic performance be fully understood.1 In this research I described
what I called the "polítical formula" of the country. I did not make any attempt to extract a magic for-
mula for providing stability and democracy. Instead, I described mechanisms and functions of stabiliza-
tion, which may help us understand Costa Rica and offer a new approach to Latin American politics.
In this article, I shall ftrst explain my approach. Second, I shall describe the political formula of
the country and how that formula can explain Costa Rica's stability. Third, I shall emphasize a
particular mechanism of stabilization Úlat is, in my view, the most interesting lesson one can draw
from a study of contemporary Costa Rica, the permanent socialization of the masses. Finally, I shall
comment on the way a democracy can remain stable when facing an economic crisis and a hostile inter-
national environment.
ABOUT THE APPROACH
The starting point for my investigation was a dissatisfaction with the approaches commonly used
to explain Costa Rica's democratic performance, as well as with those used to study Latin American
politics in general. Studies concerning Costa Rica are of two kinds: those concerned with the coun-
try's history, which use cultural, economic, social and polítical indicators to draw an irreversible evolu-
tion toward an occidental democratic order; and those that take for granted the exceptional nature of the
Costa Rican regime and try to enumerate the society's distinctive features. The first type does not ex-
plain but rather commemorates, meaning that every historical event is considered as an evolutionary
stage. The second type describes social features, but does not explain either.2
1 See Olivier Dabene, "La formule politique du Costa Rica", PhD diss., Institut d'Etudes Politiques,
Grenoble, 1987.
2 The first approach is the core of official propaganda, but can be found in many studies, such as Juan
Bosch, Una interpretación de la historia costarricense (San José: Juricentro, 1980); Carlos Monge, His-
toria de Costa Rica (San José: ECR, 1980). The second is typical of the developmenta1 period of polit-
ical science and is close to tauto10gy: democracy is defined by certain criteria, and those criteria are
supposed to explain democracy. See, for instance, James Busey, Notas sobre la democracia costarricense
(San José: ECR, 1968). Of course, 1 do not claim that all scho1ars fit into this rather reductionist
categorization. Some, like José Luis Vega Carballo, offer a very complete explanation of Costa Rican
democracy: Poder poUtico y democracia (San José: Porvenir, 1982), or Hacia una interpretación del
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Observation of Costa Rica in the 1980s shows how a regime must sacrifice enough democracy to
remain stable without damaging its reputation. The political scientist must shift attention from the
democratic characteristics of the country to the recipes that are used to preserve stability and to the con-
ditions that can affect that stability.
If we assume that the stability of a polity is the continuity of the elements identifying that
polity,3 we must conclude that an exhaustive description of the system's characteristics must precede
any discussion of stability.
The study of a political formula allows us both to present a complete, multidimensional descrip-
tion of a political system and to develop a conceptual schema that can integrate all of these elements
into a global explanation of its stability.4 The idea is to follow the emergence of social conflicts from
grass-roots politics up to its influence on the decision making process and to describe how in retum the
ruling sectors impose their domination.
The study of a political formula includes seven analyticallevels: social structure, cultural identifi-
cation, mobilization, mediation, institutions, decision making, and domination. The first, the grass-
roots level, describes the social structure. The historical process of social stratification and the way
population is distributed according to demographic, social, and economic factors are studied. The pur-
pose of this type of analysis is to clarify social segmentation. Social mobility is also studied to get an
idea of the evolution of the social configuration.
The actors composing the different segments of society may or may not be aware of belonging to a
specific social group. ConsequentIy, the second level analyzes cultural identification. In this study I
describe the main features of Costa Rica's political culture as well as the feeling of belonging to a so-
cial class.
These two levels characterize the social and cultural basis of politics and give us an idea of the ob-
jective degree of segmentation a political system has to face.5 Nevertheless, we cannot say that, for
instance, when a social group's living conditions are poor (as measured in terms of loss in purchasing
power, or of acquisition of a culture of poverty), the situation automatical1y leads to violent
demonstrations.
desarrollo costarricense : ensayo sociológico (San José: Porvenir, 1983). For a complete review of
available explanations, see Olivier Dabene, "En torno a la estabilidad política de Costa Rica: tres
paradigmas, dos conceptos, una fórmula," Anuario de Estudios Centroamericanos 12, nQ1 (1986): 41-52.
3 Keith Dowding and Richard Kimber, "The Meaning and Use of 'Political Stability,''' European Journal o[
Polítical Research 11, n~ (September 1983): 229-243.
4 The political formula approach was flIst partially elaborated by Yves Schemeil in Sociologie du Sys-
teme Politique Libanais (Grenoble: PUG 1976).
5 See Olivier Dabene, "Las bases sociales y culturales de lo político en Costa Rica," Revista de Ciencias
Sociales n~l (March 1986): 67-83.
3
In this respect, the third level of analysis, political and social mobilization, is a very important one
from the theoretical point of view. On the one hand, one must examine how collective actors take ac-
tion to defend their common interests. On the other, one must describe how the political system im-
pregnates the social fabrico Groups mobilize to defend themselves, but at the same time they are
mobilized (or socialized) by the elites who try to organize a consensus and to legitimize themselves.
The comparison between the flow coming from the bottom, spontaneous mobilization, and the one
coming from the top, organized mobilization, gives an idea of the regulation capacities of a polity.
Social groups that decide to defend their interests seek to send their demands up to the decision
makers. At a fourth level, 1 describe the mediation mechanisms used to transmit the demands. The
pressure groups, the unions, and the political parties select the demands they chose to represent, but a
complex network of informal mediation mechanisms (kind of an invisible political party) directIy
satisfies numerous personal needs.
The competition between the parties or the pressure groups and the relations between the govern-
ment and the governed take place in a legal framework that historical evolution has shaped. At a fifth
level, institutions and administrative constraint are described, thereby facilitating comprehension of the
system's functioning.
At the sixth level, the observation of the policymaking process teaches us how government reacts
to pressure. The rationale that demands the implementation of certain policies reveals the ideological
orientation of the decision makers. A glance at the organization of the bureaucracy gives an idea of the
actual process of policy implementation, and of dealing with demands.
Finally at the seventh level, we must go back from the top to the bottom to describe the domina-
tion process. Three perspectives have been used: the historical (the evolution of the forms of domina-
tion), the ideological (the sources of legitimacy used to consolidate domination), and the elite (who
governs and with the help of whom).
THE POLlTlCAL FORMULA OF COSTA RICA
Each level contributes significantIy to the stabilization (or destabilization) of the system. Let us
now characterize the formula and evaluate the stabilizing potentials.
Costa Rica has a history of relatively homogeneous social structure. Poverty was widespread dur-
ing the colonial period, so hidalgos could not base their domination on economic disparities. After in-
dependence, the coffee economy fragmented the society but did not horizonta1ly stratify it. On the con-
trary, the vertical ties typical of a clientelistic society were reinforced by an inseparable couple pa-
trón/peón. After the 1948 revolution, redistributive policies and the high cost of education increased
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the size of the middle sectors at a time when the closing of the frontier was limiting upward social mo-
bility.
Nevertheless, all of the social indicators 1examined evidence a disarticulation of this well-balanced
and rather flexible social structure. The fact that the country experienced one of the highest birth rates
in the world in the 1960s today constitutes a tremendous handicap. A growing proportion of the popu-
lation is now marginalized, especially since the economic collapse between 1979 and 1982.6 About
30 percent of the population is considered "poor," a phenomenon that was unknown in the 1970s. This
leads to frustration, and confrontation between classes replaces the faith in progress that characterized
the population after 1948. The middle sectors are particularly affected by this feeling of deprivation,
having lost 30 percent of their income between 1979 and 1981.
Costa Rica's political culture, a culture of compromise, clearly compensates for this disarticula-
tion. Since colonial times, when poverty forced everybody lOcompromise, the Costa Ricans have had
a tendency to look for compromise lOavoid confrontation. This culture has been shaped primarily by
the style of social relationships that existed in the countryside between the coffee planter and the pe-
ones. Compromise was necessary because the patr6n needed labor for production and stocks held as a
guarantee for English creditors, and the peones needed extra money so lOok advantage of high wages.
With modemization, clientelism did not disappear. In the 1950s, the Partido Liberación Nacional
(pLN) took the place of the traditional patr6n as a broker between the national political system and the
small communities.
Cultural features perpetuate the search for compromise: choteo, a kind of mockery of those who
break the social norm of coolness; brochismo, an attitude of flattery that reactivates clientelistic rela-
tionships; or palanganeo, a typical manner of bargaining in the decision making process with the sole
purpose of satisfying everybody involved (which is, of course, virtually impossible and explains the
social deadlock of the society as well as certain foreign policy initiatives). In addition to these stabiliz-
ing elements, Costa Ricans have a religious faith in their political institutions. The strong legitimacy
of those institutions is fed by continuous propaganda. Clientelism, compromise-oriented culture, and,
institutionallegitimacy explain why no real confrontation between classes has yet emerged in Costa
Rica, although the social structure is getting more and more rigid.
Another dimension of the low-level conflict orientation of Costa Rican society is the population's
traditionally weak propensity for mobilization. Costa Ricans are definitely not a people of spectacu-
6 On September 18, 1981, Costa Rica official!y declared itself bankrupt and stopped making debt pay-
ments. The costs of the crisis were not wel! distributed: the GNP/capita decline was 16.5 percent in
1981-1982, the average salary fel! by 44 percent and the 500 percent devaluation of the colón favored
exporters.
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larly violent mobilization; their political participation cannot be reduced to the casting of a ballot every
four years, however. lt appears that each social group has a particular way of expressing its demands
through spontaneous mobilizations. Due to the scarce means of communication, blocking of roads is a
very spectacular, although not very efficient, way of protesting, and is used by food producers, as well
as by some towns (the second-Iargest city, Cartago, has been regularly blocking the only road leading
to the capital for fifteen years 10demand a highway). The private sector usually sends petitions directly
to the president to suggest modifications in policy. Students and unions try to organize street demon-
strations, but they have not been very successfullately. Land invasion has been a recurrent device for
about thirty years, and from time to time rural violence makes the headlines of newspapers in the capi-
tal. Plantation workers often go on strike, but not very successfully either. The means of protest ap-
pear 10be highly segmented and social discontent is dispersed. Union federations never organize unified
demonstrations.7 Recently, however, there is evidence of a multiplication of desperate forms of
mobilization, such as hunger strikes and violent land invasions.
Conceming legal participation, it is worth noting the decline of trade unionismo The solidarist as-
sociations8 that are taking the place of unions are a clear manifestation of the conservative shift of
Costa Rican society in the eighties.9 Although the disarticulation of the social structure could
strengthen the Left, the contrary is happening. The explanation lies in the ruling sectors' tremendous
effort 10organize mobilization since 1948, and more recentIy around the concept of crisis. 10
The great achievement of contemporary Costa Rica has been 10impose a legitimate conception of
the polity that includes the delimitation of parallel spaces for possible mobilization. The rhetoric of
the crisis helps to find a balance between the obligations of democracy (to open up participation) and
7 The last two important mobilizations (apart from the banana strikes) were in 1970, against the Alu-
minum Company of America (ALCOA), and a march for peace in 1984.
8 Solidarist associations (asociaciones solidaristas) emerged in 1948, in the midst of political turmoils,
as an alternative to trade unions. The founder, Alberto Martén, wanted to promote a "pacific revolution"
through the union of workers and employers. The solidarist associations he created were like friendly
societies, or mutual-aid societies, and brought material benefits to the workers through the constitution of
savings banks. Nevertheless it is not until the 1980s that the solidarist movement started to be
successful. There were 35 associations in 1950, 98 in 1979, 216 in 1981, 500 in 1983, and 735 in
1984. Moreover, between 1979 and 1981, the number of trade unions declined from 325 to 259. See
Gustavo Blanco, La paradoja solidarista: retos teóricos y prácticos de un movimiento obrero-patronal al
movimiento obrero y popular costarricense (San José: Centro de Formación Costarricense, 1984).
9 The legal environment has been very favorable to the solidarist associations. Although practically all
strikes are dec1ared illegal in Costa Rica and there is no legal protection for unionized workers (fueros
sindicales ), the solidarist associations have been granted special legal status encouraging their activities
(Ley solidarista , November 28, 1984).
10 Since 1948, the Left has been persecuted by the PLN (until 1975, the Communist party was illegal).
Nevertheless its semic1andestine nature never led Manuel Mora and his Partido Vanguardia Popular to any
guerrilla activities. Because for thirty-five years the PLN defended reform positions, there was liule
political space left for Mora (see Manuel Solís, La crisis de la izquiedra costarricense: consideraciones
para una discusión (San José: Centro de Estudios para la Acción Social, 1985).
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those of stability (to control spontaneous mobilization), because the limitation of democracy is pre-
sented as a condition for stability.
The bodies participating in the mediation process (political parties, unions, pressure groups) are
very selective about the demands they choose to represento Roughly, it can be said that there is an
overrepresentation of the middle sectors and that the numerous private sector pressure groups are directly
involved in decision making.11 The demands of the great majority of the people-land and housing-
are ignored. Those sectores olvidados can nevertheless take advantage of an immense network of infor-
mal mediation based on connections at different levels (family, friends, neighbors, brokers, and so
forth).
The progressive substitution of unions by solidarist associations tends to diminish the role of the
mediation process. Based on an ideology of social harmony, the solidarist movement insists on the
complementarity of worker and employer and brings material benefits to the former while ridding the
latter of any "politicized" organization inside the productioíl unit. But by doing so, the solidarist
movement leaves workers face to face with employers; thus both find themselves in the nineteenth-
century situation where the peón stood alone in front of the patrón and depended on him for his wel-
fare.
The evolution of these associations combined with the direct association of the private sector to the
government leaves no space for a mediation process, and access to power is nearly nonexistent for the
lower sectors. Should they be able to gain power, the lower sectors probably could not implement the
policies they are fighting for, because of the deadlock of the administration and the institutions.
The circumstances ofthe 1949 regime's emergence (Figueres, who had won the civil war, could not
win the majority in the assembly that drafted the constitution) and the heritage of fraudulent elections
(the legislative assembly was in charge of the election process during most of the nineteenth century)
explain the complexity of the system of checks and balances the 1949 constitution provides. The con-
trolling bodies (supreme court, government controller, electoral tribunal) have great power, which leads
to an immobilization of the decision making process that can be compared to a lame-duck presidency.
Both the economic and the foreign policies that I have examined in detail confmn this picture.
Nevertheless, there is a significant difference between the decision making structure involved in these
two crucial areas and the one involved in social policies. In the latter case, the rationale seems to be to
11 Pressure groups such as Coalición Costarricense de Iniciativas de Desarrollo (CINDE), Asociación
Costarricense de Gerentes y Empresarios (ACOGE), Asociación Nacional de Fomento Económico (ANFE),
Instituto Costarricense del Sector Empresarial (INCOSEM), Unión Costarricense de Cámaras y
Asociaciones de la Empresa Privada (UCCAEP), and the different chambers-Cámara de Comercio. Cámara
de Industrias--regularly meet with the president and government officials.
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dilute popular demands by means of a tremendously complicated administration, which, incidentally,
can lead to bureaucratic enclaves that breed the clientelistic networks. In the case of the economic and
foreign policies, there are a few key positions and personalities that are given a great degree of liberty
(the case of John Biehl, a Chilean college friend of Arias, who originated the Arias Peace Plan, is rather
typical, as is that ofRodrigo Carazo, former president [1978-1982], politically opposoo to the PLN but
who is now helping to gather the Sandinistas and the Contras around the negotiation table).
Conceming the orientation of the economic policy, the evolution toward neoliberalism is quite
clear, as it is in almost all of Latin America. The privatization of CODESA (Corporación Costarri-
cense de Desarrollo) is a manifestation of the backing of the state-controlled economy. But for Costa
Rica, this evolution could mean more than a simple reorientation of the economy causOOby intema-
tional pressures. Since 1948, the constant growth of the public sector has provided important upward
social mobility, as well as an extension of the PLN's potential clientele.12 The spoils system and
corruption have allowOOthe PLN to reward its followers. If these mechanisms disappear, the state will
have to face growing resentment from large sectors of the population. Nevertheless, because in the
1986 elections voters trusted the PLN to bury its own symbols, the country did not end up like the
Uruguay of twenty years ago.13
Because the disarticulation of the social structure has not 100to any social turmoil, the domination
process must be very efficient in Costa Rica from at least three points of view: aUthority, legitimacy,
and homogeneity of the actors involved in the process. The conquistadores dynasty, as Stone calls
it,14 Wasrather hegemonic until the beginning of this century. The nineteenth-century coffee Republic
progressively opened up the system (direct vote in 1913, secret ballot in 1928), thanks to the clientele-
controlled enfranchisement of the poor and the cost of OOucation. The events of 1948 do not represent
the accession to power of the middle sectors, as has often been claimed, but rather a violent shift in the
development process that would incidentally favor the middle sectors.15 There was indeOOvery little
change in the power structure, proof of which was the fact that the bourgeoisie droppOOits support of
Calderón long before 1948.
12 The proportion of the active population employed in the public sector rose from 6.1 percent in 1950,
to 18.4 percent in 1980.
13 Concerning the 1986 election, see Olivier Dabene, "Les Elections du 2 février 1986 au Costa Rica:
Continuités et Ruptures," Problemes d'Amérique Latine, nQ81 (1986): 3-20. During bis campaign, Oscar
Arias clearly announced some deregulation measures.
14 Samuel Stone, La dinastía de los conquistadores. Crisis del poder en la Costa Rica contemporánea (San
José: EDUCA, 1982).
15 Jacobo Schifter calls Figueres's style an "authoritative transformism," in La fase oculta de la Guerra
Civil en Costa Rica (San José: EDUCA, 1981).
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It is also erroneous to speak of conflict between current factions in the bourgeoisie.16 There is
surely some disagreement about the appropriate economic policy to be followed, but a close look at the
actors reveals a very homogeneous and well-integrated ruling class. Thanks to the system of joint
stock companies, participation in chambers of commerce or industry, or even frequent changes of activ-
ity, elites constitute a social class united by cultural affinities and close ideological references.17
Rodrigo Madrigal Nieto, the current minister of foreign affairs (canciller ), provides a rather typical
example. His political evolution parallels that of the entire ruling class. In 1959, the same year the
Law of Industrial Protection and Development was passed (by an anti-PLN president, Mario Echandi,
and a PLN-dominated assembly), he was president of the Chamber of Industry. We can assume that he
was at that time connected 10 the PLN. At present, he is involved in every important sector of the
economy (press, trade, industry, finance, service). Between 1978 and 1982, he was president of the
anti-PLN-dominated assembly and was close 10president Carazo. In 1985, he made an important last-
minute financial contribution to the Arias campaign and now supports the PLN again.
THE POLlTlCAL ST ABILlTY OF COSTA RICA
The elements of the political formula that I have described, some of which stabilize the polity
while others destabilize it, create the political stability of Costa Rica. The different contributions are
summarized in figure 1:
16 Following Nicos Poulantzas, a lot of Costa Rican sociologists tend to infer fractions of the bour-
geoisie competing for hegemonic domination from the economic infrastructure. See for instance Ana
Sojo, Estado empresario y lucha política en Costa Rica (San José: EDUCA, 1984).
17 A study of the list of the stockholders of the newspaper La Nación, of the members of different private
chambers, and of the résumés of numerous government officials has aIlowed me to discover an informal
network that constitutes the core of the ruling class.
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Figure 1: Stabilizing (centripetal) and destabilizing (centrifugal) elements












INST ITUT ION S MEDIATION
These elements interact in a complex way. The fragmented social structure is compensated for by a
culture of compromise; organized mobilization in the form of a sacralization of the sociopolitical order
tends to weaken spontaneous mobilization; underrepresentation of popular demands in pressure groups
is softened by clientelistic networks; the disarticulated decision making process is balanced by the inte-
grated and homogeneous domination process. These elements exist side by side with other more fre-
quently mentioned components: the extension of the middle sectors thanks to redistributive policies;
strong legitimacy resting on the commemoration of the regime's founder events; a two-party system
allowing frequent opposition victories; paternalistic leaders; a self-effacing arrny; the structural support
of the church; and the elites' accommodation.
Although it may seem that 1 take into account only the internal factors of stability, this is not ex-
actly the case, since constant American influence is not neglected in my study. (How could it be, when
the U.S. Embassy staff in San José grew from 35 persons in 1983 10 150 in 1985?) Nevertheless, be-
cause 1 am con cerned for the moment with structural stability, and because 1 assume that American
pressures are more relevant during certain historical periods, 1 shall keep my remarks on that topic for
the last.
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How does the political formula that I have outlined provide stability? If we emphasize the double
dimension of the stability phenomenon-weak social tensions and an efficient domination process-
there are two possible explanations.
First, social tensions produced by the rigidity of the social structure and producing spontaneous
mobilizations are channeled, because demands are individually satisfied (clientelism, patronage, com-
padrazgo ), or diluted by the numerous centers of political or bureaucratic decisions. In the latter case,
confidence in the system's capacity to solve the social problems renders needless the mobilizations. In
the former, the search for personal connections weakens the process of raising class consciousness.
Second, there is no struggle for control of the state apparatus among Costa Rican elites; each
dique can get its share of power. Every administration respects the tradition of compromise, and no
radical decision is ever taken (during the Monge administration [1982-1986] hardly any decision at all
was taken).18 The implementation of public policies is a very tortuous process in which the upper
middle sectors controlling the bureaucracy can blackmail the government to better their position. The
decision making structure is therefore totally deadlocked, and elites are forced to insist on symbolic
domination, which is less restrictive and far more legitimate.
ORGANIZED MOBILlZA nON
Among the different mechanisms of stability mentioned earlier, there is one of particular impor-
tance that is seldom analyzed, if not completely ignored: organized mobilization. A serious study of
the literature about Costa Rica is quite interesting. The country is always presented as a kind of
promised land where Rousseauist democracy can flourish. Indeed, in comparison with the rest of Cen-
tral America, Costa Rica might appear to be a true paradise. Anthropologists have taught us, however,
that every myth has a function. And if we recall the theorem of American sociologist W. 1. Thomas
that "if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences," it seems obvious to me that
in the Costa Rican case, the way the reality is presented has a regulatory function.
It has often been said that France was a "republic of discourses," and we know how the French
Revolution transformed the struggle between interests trying to gain access to power into a struggle
between discourses aimed at gaining legitimacy.19 The civil war of 1948 in Costa Rica played a simi-
lar roleo The events of 1948 are less important for the change in the power structure they led to,
18 Even the proclamation of neutrality was a nondecision in the sense that it revealed the wish to avoid
taking a position on Central American issues.
19 As Franyois Furet put it in Penser la Révolution Fran~aise, Paris: Gallimard (1978).
11
however, than for the new interpretation of his10ry they launched. The new "elite settlement,,20 did not
concern the so-called middle-class access to power, but a new formula of legitimacy.21 This new
legitimating discourse relies on an interpretation of the country's history that stresses the democratic
nature of the people through the idealized figure of the labrador. Since 1948, Costa Rica has exten-
sively used political propaganda to reactivate permanent consensus. The exercise of democracy takes
place in a constant setting with a variable scenario. Let us examine the different actors in this social-
ization process.
The main role belongs to the presiden 1. Venerated by all, including the opposition, he personalizes
democracy. By traveling often across the country, or by giving speeches that are irnmediately printed in
the newspapers or shown on television, he is very close to the people. The small size of the country
helps a 101. Moreover, he almost always appears with the archbishop of San José and the American
ambassador, so that the people can visualize the magic triangle "democracy-God-United States" that
provides the country's stability. My analysis of presidential speeches shows that the sociopolitical or-
der is sacralized in Costa Rica and the opposition considered to be anathema.22 Democracy is the
product of an irreversible evolution and reflects national culture. Democracy is therefore destiny.
The government also breeds official propaganda by never forgetting 10publicize its policies. There
is no "ministry of mobilization and human resource development" like in Jamaica during the Manley
era, but the Ministry of Government and Police plays the same role of political education, thanks to the
National Secretariat for Community Development (Dirección Nacional de Desarrollo Comunal, DI-
NADECO), which control s a network of development associations throughout the country. The Min-
istry of Education provides another example. It is granted one-third of the national budget23 and im-
poses on all schools a yearly program of civic acts (actos cívicos). Studying those acts, as well as
20 "Elites settlements are relatively rare events in which warring national elite factions suddenly and de-
liberately reorganize their relations by negotiating compromises on their most basic disagreements". See
Michael Burton and John Higley Elite Settlements, Texas Papers on Latin America, nQ 87-01 (Austin:
Institute of Latin American Studies, 1987). We might also use the concepts of "pact" or "Democratic
Class Compromise," referring to the three characteristics stressed by Terry Karl: pacts are founding
agreements, they have a rule-making character, and they are inclusionary. See Terry Karl, "Pacts and the
Transition to Democracy in Latin America," paper presented at the Latin American Studies Association
XIV International Congress, New Orleans (March 17-19, 1988).
21 Here I am using "political formula" as Mosca did. According to this author, "ruling classes do not
justify their power exclusively by de facto possession of it, but try to find a moral and legal basis for it,
representing it as the 10gical and necessary consequence of doctrines and beliefs that are generally
recognized and accepte. This legal and moral basis, or principIe, on which the power of the political
class rests, is what we call the 'polítical formula.''' (Gaetano Mosca The Ruling Class [New York and
London: Mc Graw-Hill Book Company, 1939], p. 70).
22 Analysis of twenty-eight presidential speeches given between June and September 1985, in Dabene,
La Formule Politique du Costa Rica.
23 This percentage has been shrinking dramatically, however, from 37 percent in 1970 to 22 percent in
1982 and to 17 percent planned for 1988.
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textbooks, I noted the evolutionary vision of history, especially in the presentation of the three most
glorious dates: 1856 (victory over William Walker, defense of national integrity), 1889 (official birth
of democracy), and 1948 (civil war to defend democracy).24 Surely 1987 will now be added to this list
as the year the rest of the world finally realized how exemplary Costa Rica is (recall that Costa Rica has
been a candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize since 1982).
Cooperating with the president and the government, the private sector (which actually is almost
part of the government) plays an important part in the process I am describing. Business associations
are very active in financing civic information campaigns in the newspapers or on television. The prin-
cipal organization, the Costa Rican Coalition of Initiatives for Development (Coalición Costarricense
de Iniciativas de Desarrollo, CINDE), has a specific program called "Motivation and Communication,"
the purpose of which is to mobilize public opinion. The ideas that are put forward always mix refer-
ences to democracy and to economic propositions (in 1985, for example, a slogan could be seen all
over the country saying "Private business produces freedom"-"La empresa privada produce libertad").
All the pressure groups, political parties, and unions are also very active in producing propaganda.
During an electoral campaign, speeches never refer to political or economic issues, but the competition
is tough to sound more democratic than other candidates. Even the Communist party insists on the
necessity of purifying Costa Rican democracy. Except on the plantations, unions also insist on being
an essential component of democracy. And the recent development of the Solidarist Movement evi-
dences a will to stick closer to the basics of democracy (social harmony, essentially).
It goes without saying that the media (newspapers, especially La Nación, radio, and television) are
crucial to the propaganda process. They clearly consider themselves not only as vectors, but as sources
of mobilization.
The people receive this flood of propaganda with great enthusiasm because it confirms their belief
that Costa Rica is very much an Arcadia in Central America. Everybody in this country, from the
campesino isolated in the mountains to the bank clerk in the capital, supports the regime and truly be-
lieves that no better system is possible.25
In short, everybody, from the top down, is active in this psychological war. This consensus can
be affected from time to time, but Costa Rica verifies Merton's idea of the "self-fulfilling prophecy."
The stability of a country rests directly on the shared belief that it can be nothing but stable. But at a
24 During the 1985 school year, forty-seven actos cívicos were staged, of which 24 percent concerned
historical events and 17 percent social categories.
25 Df course, we are talking here about a diffusive support to the democratic regime, not about specific
support of an incumbent administration.
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time when external threats are tragically real, a country has to develop a tremendous propaganda effort
to avoid the "suicidal prophecy."
A last example of the role of words in politics concerns the overuse of the word crisis. The main
vector of official propaganda, La Nación, acts sometimes as an avant-garde as far as the ideological ori-
entation of the elites is concerned. To legitimate the neoliberal shift, La Nación, as well as the gov-
ernment, uses the rhetoric of crisis. In a study I did of the editorials published in La Nación in 1985,
it was clear that the Central American geopolitical crisis was used to legitimate specific economic ori-
entations.26 The main idea was that communism in Nicaragua was so unpopular that all Nicaraguans
were fleeing to Costa Rica and that the economy could not support such a burden.27 An equation was
formulated: Nicaragua = communism = refugees = economic weight = deficits, which makes austerity
necessary .
In 1985, one editorial out of three was dedicated, directly or indirectly, to Nicaragua. Speaking
more broadly, Nicaragua is part of a global vision of the world crisis situation. Costa Rica is in an
economic, social, political, and moral crisis. The causes of the crisis are external aggression aggravated
by internal destabilization. The symptoms are weakness of public policies and the ungovernability of
the democracy. La Nación proposes a therapy for each cause and symptom of the crisis: the regional
crisis will end with the defeat of the Sandinistas, and the intemal destabilization with more efficient se-
curity forces. Concerning the economic crisis, "Reaganomics" is suggested as a cure.
Nevertheless, Costa Rican neoliberalism is very moderate, as is everything in this country, and
that is why it is easily accepted. But overuse of the word crisis is confusing for the people who, in the
end, do not know what crisis it is all about. They simply know that the country is in crisis. And they
also know that Nicaragua is bad. The ruling class and La Nación have convinced everybody that the
latter explains the former.
ST ABILITY, DEMOCRACY AND CRISIS
When we taIk about crisis in Costa Rica, we must refer to two aspects that are intimately con-
nected: the economic crisis, and the regional crisis. I shall confine myself here to a few remarks to
correct some too-easily-accepted assertions.
26 Analysis of 334 editorials published between March 3 and November 19, 1985, in Dabene, La Formule
Politique du Costa Rica.
27 It is impossible to get an exact idea of the number of Nicaraguans living in Costa Rica. Propaganda
referred to 250 000 Nicaraguans in Costa Rica in 1985 (10 percent of the total population), but the
United Nations high commissioner for refugees registered only 30 000 refugees.
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The political stability of contemporary Costa Rica (since 1948) is in many ways the consequence
of the state-controlled economy. The developmental model has alIowed the state to penetrate the soci-
ety deeply and, therefore, gradualIy to open up the system (universal suffrage in 1948, compulsory vot-
ing in 1959, voting age lowered to eighteen in 1971, legalization of the Communist party in 1975)
while controlling popular mobilization (repression of unions, strikes systematically declared illegal).
This pattem of a patemalistic democracy pleased everybody unti11976. In that year, it began to be
obvious that the import-substituting economy of the Central American Common Market was not as
promising as it has been ten years before. In Costa Rica, industrialists started to complain about the
public absorption of available credits through CODESA (Corporación Costarricense de Desarrollo).
The debate around CODESA is a very complex one, still not resolved. Suffice it to say that the private
sector agreed to support CODESA's creation in 1972, providing that it got some benefits. When it be-
carne clear that CODESA was serving the PLN's political goal of building a mixed economy, the pri-
vate sector switched its support to the opposition.28 Nineteen seventy-six to 1986 can be considered,
then, a period of transition during which the country avoided an evolution like the Uruguayan. (In 1966
Uruguay was in the middle of a similar crisis, and democracy broke down.) Two hypotheses can be
forwarded to explain why Costa Rica's democracy remained stable.
First is the regional context. Costa Rica experiences a "Nicaraguan effect" but it does not affect it
the way many people think it does. During the 1985 electoral campaign, in fact, a minister publicly
admitted that the Sandinista revolution was very good business in that it brought $200 million ayear
in economic assistance, which represents roughly a tenth of Costa Rica's GNP and a third of its annual
budget,29 Another aspect of the Nicaraguan effect is the symbolic dimension. The media, which are
very active in the diffusion of official propaganda, constantly project a misleading image of Nicaragua,
so that the Costa Rican people feel very lucky to live in the "most wonderful democracy in the world."
The legitimacy of the regime is therefore very much enhanced, as noted earlier.
Second are characteristics of domestic politics. In 1976, the private sector decided to shift its sup-
port to the anti-PLN coalition (that same year, the principal parties in the opposition signed the Pacto
de Ojo de Agua and formed the Coalición Unidad); as a consequence, Rodrigo Carazo was elected in
1978. But Carazo's erratic economic policy did very little to serve the private sector's interests and ac-
tually precipitated the economic collapse. In 1982, the private sector tumed again to the PLN. Monge,
thanks to American assistance, stabilized the economic situation and was forced to terms by the prívate
28 See Mylena Vega, El estado costarricense de 1974 a 1978 : CODESA y la fracción industrial (San José:
Hoy, 1982).
29 Moreover, this economic assistance comes primarily as donations and not as loans (in 1985, 87 per-
cent was given outright).
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chambers, as we shall see in a momento The 1986 election of Oscar Arias marked the victory of the
prívate sector's conception of a more liberal economy, and many more businessmen, like Rodrigo
Madrigal Nieto, are now part of the government. This reconciliation, or new elite settlement, helped
by a renewal of the ruling stratum30 could herald a new basis for consensus in Costa Rica.
It is important to understand two things. This change has indeed strengthened polítical stability,31
but it has occurred in a way that leaves no doubt concerning the country's priority: stability. Let us
detail the way in which a new elite settlement was achieved in 1984.
OnNovember 7, 1983, the Union of Prívate Chambers (Unión Costarricense de Cámaras y Aso-
ciaciones de la Empresa Privada, UCCAEP) sent the president a "proposition for a socioeconomic
pact". Its objective was to maintain the stabilization of the economy (decrease inflation, contract
deficits) and to reactivate it (promote exports, attract investments), while distributing the eventual so-
cial costs equally. The proposed plan did not propose anything original; it was simply a proposal in
the tradition of the peticiones that are regularly sent to the president. Between November 1983 and
spring 1984, however, the private sector raised its voice, and the result was what is called a "coup
d'état a la tica" ( Le., the Costa Rican way).
Increased internal and external tensions began 1984. Between December 1983 and June 1984, inci-
dents on the border with Nicaragua were more numerous, which provoked violent anti-Communist me-
dia campaigns (La Naci6n). The American ambassador (Curtin Winsor), the private sector, and some
ministers joined the media campaign. At the same time, the situation in the countryside was getting
serious. In March 1984, a land invasion in the southwestern part of the country (including 400 fami-
líes and 10,000 acres, of which only 250 were cultivated), was severely repressed by the Guardia Rural
and led to one death and 700 arrests. A Communist plot was announced by the press, and the minister
of publíc security, Angel Solano, in charge of the Guardia Civil, criticized the brutality of the Guardia
Rural and publícly disagreed with the minister of government, Alfonso Carro, in charge of the latter,
about the best way of handling a land invasion situation. During April, May, and June, there were
more land invasions and here and there strikes (social workers, railway employees, even the vendedores
ambulantes). In July, two important social conflicts further undermined the situation. July 10 began
what would be the longest banana strike in history, with 3,000 workers involved on twenty-one
30 Neither Oscar Arias nor Rafael Angel Calderón, the candidates in 1986, is a 1948 veterano Therefore,
they are not cornmitted to the choices that were made at that time and can propose new ideas.
31 As Mitchell Seligson measured it, although he failed to note the qualitative evolution we just
stressed. See Mitchell Seligson, "Political Support under Crisis Conditions : Costa Rica, 1978-1983,"
paper presented at the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, 1985.
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plantations belonging to United Brands Company.32 On July 16, another strike began, organized by
the very powerful National Association of Educators (Asociación Nacional de Educadores, ANDE),
which claims 30,000 members.
The situation was not all bad, however. On the northern border, the tension decreased. The at-
tempt to kill Eden Pastora in La Penca in May 1984 led to a deep crisis inside ARDE (Alianza Rev-
olucionaria Democrática), and Eden Pastora's resistance was paralyzed. The economic situation was
also much better. The unemployment rate was down to 7.8 percent, compared to 9 percent the year be-
fore. Inflation, 33 percent in 1983, was down to 12 percent in 1984, and GNP reached an impressive
7.9 percent (2.7 percent in 1983). The hardening of the unions' and the business sector's attitudes was
therefore on1ysymbolic. With cconomic revival in sight, everybody was trying to channel the expected
benefits.
On July 1, President Monge returned from a long trip to Europe. The same day, Vice-President
Alberto Fait resigned to enter the race for nomination from the PLN. His resignation cost Monge a
personality that had helped to maintain the cohesion of a government deeply divided by the ministers
who favored a tough response to land invasions and social conflicts (e.g., Alfonso Carro), and those
who were accused of weakness and complicity with the Communists (Fernando Berrocal, minister of
the presidency, and Angel Solano, e.g.).
On July 11, UCCAEP sent the president documents "proving that some peasants' organizations
and unions, with the collaboration of some government officials, are elaborating a plan for destabilizing
the country. ,,33 Then on the cighteenth, the Chamber of Commerce sent an ultimatum to the presi-
dent,34 giving him one month to modify his economic policy substantially and to end the social tur-
moil. This ultimatum was real1y out of tune in the Costa Rican context, in the sense that, besides
suggesting economic measures, it stressed political issues. The president was ordered to be more au-
thoritative 10 fight the Communist destabilization plan, and an investigation of certain government of-
ficials was demanded as was the breaking off of diplomatic relations with Nicaragua. If nothing were
done within thirty days, the chamber promised to take further steps to fight communism.
It was a tremendous change compared to the petición scnt eight months earlier. It is worth not-
ing, however, that the president of the Chamber of Commerce was the president of the Union of
32 It remains to be seen to what extcnt this strike will further weaken the Left. When the workers ended
the strike on October 11, not only had they not gottcn the wage increases they were asking for, but they
had lost about one million dollars. As far as the government was concerned, it had to face the
intransigence of the unions and the company, both of which had an interest in a long conflict.
33 Centro de Estudios para la Acción Social (CEPAS), Costa Rica: Balance de la situación ,nl>9(1985): 4.
34 The text was published in La Nación (August 1, 1984).
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Chambers, which sent the petición in November 1983. This change did not reflect any change in the
private sector; it evidenced, rather, a significant shift for which the moment was perfecto
On August 8, Angel Solano, announced that the Guardia Civil was on alert because of rumors of a
possible rightist coup. President Monge immediately denied the possibility and demanded the whole
government's resignation. Solano and Berrocal became the victims of a cabinet reshuffle that brought
into the administration a member of the Free Costa Rica Movement (Movimiento Costa Rica Libre,
MCRL), Benjamín Piza, who took over the public security ministry.
Beyond the cabinet shuffle, the change was deep; we might even speak of a new elite settlement.
The government declared a state of emergency on August 16 and sent three hundred civil guards to the
south to take care of the banana workers' strike. From that point, the government began to look at the
social movements as a matter of national security, not of social concerns. Economic policy also
changed completely in that it was liberalized (with the progressive sale by auction of CODESA sub-
sidiaries), and foreign policy evolved toward an alignment with the North American position (in 1985,
twenty-four Green Berets organized the first U.S. military training camp on Costa Rican soil, only ten
miles from the Nicaraguan border).
But even if democracy suffered somewhat, stability was preserved. A new settlement was reached
between the PLN and the private sector after ten years of disagreement. That, combined with Arias's re-
cent successes in foreign policy and strong internal propaganda, could provide the Costa Rican demo-
cratic regime with stability for quite a while.
(Dr. Olivier Dabene is a visiting vcholar at the Institute of Latín American Studies, University of
Texas at Austín. He is the recipient of a Lavoisier Scholarship granted by the French Ministry of For-
eign Affairs for the academic year 1987-1988.)
